The Constitutionality of Notice by Publication in Tax Sale Proceedings by unknown
The Constitutionality of Notice by
Publication in Tax Sale Proceedings
The statufes of all fifty states and the District of Columbia' contain
provisions for the annual sale of real estate for which the property
taxes remain unpaid.2 The sale is followed by a redemption period
during which the owner may recover his property by paying the back
taxes, plus interest at a substantial rate. If the property goes unre-
deemed, the tax sale purchaser is issued a tax deed and the owner
loses all interest in the property. This result will often be very harsh,
1. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, §§ 249-338(l) (Supp. 1973); ALAsKA STAT. ANN. §§ 29.53.200-
.390 (Supp. 1974); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-381 to -473 (Supp. 1974); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 84-1101 to -1336 (Supp. 1971); CAL. REV. 8. TAX. CODE §§ 3351-4379 (West Supp. 1974);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-11-101 to -12-113 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 12-155 to
-159 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 8701-8779 (Supp. 1974); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1001 to
-1018 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 197.012-.441 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92-8101 to
-8316 (1974); HAVAII REV. STAT. §§ 246-55 to -63 (Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 63-1114
to -1144 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 705-752.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); IND.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6-1-56-1 to -57-16 (Supp. 1974); IOwA CODE ANN. §§ 446.1-448.17 (Supp. 1974);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-2301 to -2416d, -2801 to -2810 (Supp. 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
134.430-.570 (Supp. 1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:2171-:2230 (Supp. 1975); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 1071-1084 (Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 70-123C (Supp.
1974); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 60, §§ 37-84A (Supp. 1974); Micn. CON!i. LAWS ANN. §§ 211.60-
.157 (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 280.001-284.28 (Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. §§
27-41-55 to -45-29 (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 140.010-141.970 (Supp. 1975); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §§ 84-4101 to -41-104 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-1801 to
-1941 (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 361.565-.620 (1957); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80:18-
:42-a (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §. 54:5-19 to -129 (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
72-31-60 to -74 (Special Supp. 1974); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 1000-1094 (McKinney
Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105-369 to -378 (Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
57-24-01 to -30-05 (Supp. 1973); Ouzo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5721.01-5723.19 (Page Supp.
1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 24311-24351 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 312.005-
.990 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5860.101-6154.3 (Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
9§ 44-9-1 to -46 (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 65-2761 to -2811 (Supp. 1974); S.D. Comap.
LAWs ANN. §8 10-23-1 to -26-10 (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2001 to -2046 (Supp.
1974); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 7319-7345e (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
59-10-29 to -47, -56 to -65 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5251-5263 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE
ANN. g' 58-1117.1 to -1117.11 (Supp. 1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 84.64.010-.460 (Supp.
1974); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ I IA-3-1 to -4-41 (1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 74.33-75.70 (Supp.
1974); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-123 to -156 (Interim Supp. 1974). Five states have constitu-
tional provisions concerning tax sales. ILL. CONST. art. 9, § 8; LA. CoNsT. art. 10, § 11;
MISS. CONST. § 79; MO. CONST. art. 10, § 13; WV. VA. CONST. art. 13, §§ 3-6.
The only provisions cited above are those whose major subject is tax sales. Special
provisions concerning tax sales may be found in other sections of a state's code or con-
stitution. See, e.g., N.Y. MIL. LAW § 314 (McKinney Supp. 1974); WYo. CONsT. art. 19, § 9.
Also, tax sales in a particular locality may be governed by a local law not appearing in
the state code. See, e.g., ch. 559, [1902] Laws of N.Y. 1329, as amended by ch. 474, [19183
Laws of N.Y. 1534; ch. 111, [1920] Laws of N.Y. 184; ch. 200, [1922] Laws of N.Y. 520; ch.
800, [1937) Laws of N.Y. 1770; ch. 712, [1943] Laws of N.Y. 2373, 2394; ch. 342,
[1944] Laws of N.Y. 763 (Oneida County, New York).
2. In some states, the tax sale is, in theory, an auction sale to the highest cash bidder
(see, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 246-56 (Supp. 1974)) or to the person who will accept the
smallest fractional interest in the property for payment of the back taxes (see, e.g., MIcH.
Cowir. LAWS ANN. § 211.70 (Supp. 1974)). In other states, the property is simply sold
outright for the amount of the unpaid taxes. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 312.100 (1973).
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as the owner will lose his property for taxes equalling only a small
fraction of its true value, while the tax sale purchaser will reap a
decided windfall. 3
In several states there is a serious constitutional question concerning
the adequacy of the notice given to the owner of property about to
be sold at a tax sale. In 21 jurisdictions it is possible to complete the
entire tax sale procedure with no notice to interested parties other
than by publication (or posting at the courthouse, or both).4 Such a
practice raises the distinct possibility that the owner will lose his
property without ever having known what was happening. This Note
will examine the question of whether notice solely by publication is
adequate to meet the constitutional standards of procedural due process
of law.
I. The Development of the Issue
In a series of cases decided near the turn of the century, the Su-
preme Court held that notice by publication in tax sale proceedings
did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The decisions were handed down at a time when the pro-
cedural due process doctrines of Pennoyer v. Neffl were in their hey-
day. In that case, Justice Field expounded for the Court a strongly
territorial theory of state jurisdiction. Each state possessed complete
authority over all persons and property within its borders, and had
no authority over persons or property outside its borders. 7 In particu-
lar, process of the courts of one state could not be served outside
that state.8
3. See, e.g., Wager v. Lind, 389 F. Supp. 213, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (home worth
$15,000 owned by widow with seven children sold for S174.02 in back taxes); Nelson v.
City of New York, 352 U.S. 103, 105 & n.2, 106 & n.5 (1956) (two properties worth ;52,000
sold for delinquency of $3,000).
4. The 21 jurisdictions are Alabama, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii,
Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and West
Virginia. See statutes cited in note 1 supra. In Arkansas and Oregon, publication is the
only form of notice provided in all cases. In the other 19 jurisdictions, certain owners will
receive personal notice (by mail or personal service), while others will not. See, e.g.,
N.Y. REAL PRoP. TAX LAW §§ 1100-1174 (McKinney Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§§ 44-9-9 to -10 (Supp. 1974); ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 316 (Supp. 1973).
5. Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414 (1908); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241 (1907);
Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904). While Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159
U.S. 526 (1895), approved this proposition in dictum, that case involved only a judgment
for the amount of back taxes due, not a tax sale. The land company could still have
avoided a sale of its property simply by paying the amount of the judgment. Ch. 1, § 81,
[1878] Gen. Laws of Minn. 17, 51.
6. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
7. Id. at 722.
8. Id. at 727. The doctrine failed to distinguish between process compelling a non-
resident to appear and notice simply informing himn of the action against his property.
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This doctrine created a dilemma in the case of property located
within a state but owned by a nonresident. Since the property is
within the state, the state courts should have jurisdiction to decide
disputes concerning it. But since the owner is a nonresident, he can-
not be served with process and made to defend an action brought
against him. The solution to this dilemma was found in the concept
of the proceeding in rem,9 a proceeding directly against the property
rather than against the owner of the property. Since the nonresident
owner could not be served with process, constructive notice by pub-
lication within the state was deemed sufficient.' 0
This rule was soon extended to all in rem proceedings, whether
involving property owned by nonresidents or residents." The justi-
fication for the rule, grounded in the fiction of a proceeding against
the land itself, was supplemented by the "caretaker theory." Owners
of property were held to a duty to keep themselves informed of any
proceedings affecting it.12 Thus, the general rule became that notice
by publication was constitutionally adequate in all proceedings in rem,
and tax sales were considered proceedings in rem.' 3
As American society became more mobile, it became apparent that
the strongly territorial theory of state jurisdiction was no longer via-
ble.' 4 As a result, the Pennoyer theory has been replaced by the "mini-
mum contacts" theory of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.15
The rule that the process of a state may not be served beyond its
borders is a relic of the past; today, process is routinely served outside
a state under the now familiar "long-arm" statutes. And the rule that
notice by publication is adequate for proceedings in rem was dis-
carded in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.' 6
9. Id. at 733-34. See Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 254 (1907); Huling v. Kaw Valley
Ry. 8. Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1889).
10. 95 U.S. at 727. As the doctrine was originally stated in Pennoyer, "seizure" of the
property was required in addition to the published notice. Id. But the "seizure" require-
ment was later abandoned. Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1904).
11. Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 92 (1904). See North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman,
268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925); Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414, 417-18 (1908); Winona & St.
Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U.S. 526, 537-38 (1895).
12. North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925); Longyear v. Toolan,
209 U.S. 414, 418 (1908); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 262 (1907); Huling v. Kaw
Valley Ry. & Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559, 564 (1889).
13. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 258 (1907); Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 90 (1904).
It was also said that special deference was warranted when the state was exercising the
power of taxation. Leigh v. Green, supra at 87-89.
14. For a cogent critique of Pennoyer, and a proposal to abolish the in rem/in
personam distinction, see Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965
Sup. CT. REv. 241.
15. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See Hazard, supra note 14; Kurland, The Supreme Court, the
Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHi. L. REv.
569 (1958); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909
(1960).
16. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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Mullane involved a proceeding for the judicial settlement of the
accounts of a common trust fund. The only notice given to the
beneficiaries was by publication in a local newspaper. It was argued
that this form of notice was justified because the proceeding was in
rem.1 7 In a landmark opinion, the Supreme Court held that the clas-
sification of a proceeding as in rem or in personam was irrelevant
for determining the constitutional sufficiency of the notice given.:1
The Court laid down the general principle that notice in all pro-
ceedings must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action . . . 9
Observing that publication is an extremely poor form of notice,20
the Court nevertheless approved of such notice as to those persons
whose "whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained,"
simply because no better form of notice was possible.2 1 But the Court
ruled that when the names and addresses of persons affected by a
proceeding were at hand, "the reasons disappear for resort to means
less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency."' - 2 As to
such persons, the Court held that a serious effort to provide personal
notice, at least by ordinary mail, was required.23
It might have been possible to read the Mullane case narrowly. On
its facts, it did involve a proceeding which was on the borderline of
the traditional distinction between in rem and in personam actions.
But later cases have applied the Mullane principles to bankruptcy,24
eminent domain,25 and automobile forfeiture20  proceedings, all of
which were clearly in rem under the traditional distinction.
17. Brief for Appellee Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. at 13-42, Brief of Respondent
Special Guardian and Attorney for Infants, Etc. Having an Interest in Trust Principal at
4-11, Brief of New York State Bankers Association as Amicus Curiae at 7-11, Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
18. 339 U.S. at 312-13.
19. Id. at 314. The Court added: "The means employed must be such as one desirous
of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Id. at 315.
20. Id. at 315.
21. Id. at 317.
22. Id. at 318.
23. Id. at 318, 319.
24. City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1953) (notice by
publication to creditor whose name and address are known held inadequate).
25. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (notice by publication and by
the posting of 22 notices along the route of the condemnation unconstitutional); Walker
v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (notice by publication to landowner whose
name was known unconstitutional). In Walker, the Court distinguished, in such a way as
to suggest an overruling of, two early cases (North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268
U.S. 276 (1925); Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559 (1889)) which
had upheld notice by publication in condemnation proceedings. 352 U.S. at 116 & n.6.
26. Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972) (per curiam) (notice by certified mail
addressed to owner's residence unconstitutional when state knew owner was being held
in the county jail).
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These cases make it clear that the Supreme Court has given broad
application2 7 to the standards enunciated in Mullane.28 Nevertheless,
in several recent cases, state courts in Oklahoma,2 9 Oregon,30 Michi-
gan,31 and New York 32 have adhered to the turn of the century cases
discussed earlier and have declined to apply Mullane to tax sale
proceedings. On the other hand, state courts in Kansas33 and Ari-
zona,3 4 and a federal district court in Oregon, 35 recently have applied
Mullane to tax sales and have held notice by publication unconsti-
tutional.30
Two recent cases in which state supreme courts upheld notice by
publication in tax sale proceedings were appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. In the Oklahoma case, Paschall v. Christie-Stewart,
Inc.,3 7 probable jurisdiction was noted, and the case was briefed and
orally argued. Although the Oklahoma supreme court's opinion had
addressed only the notice question, the briefs, record, and oral argu-
ment revealed that there might have been an adequate state ground
to support the result. Therefore, the Supreme Court declined to decide
27. "The general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by publication
is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known or very easily
ascertainable .... " Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1962). See Note,
Requirements of Notice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1257 (1957); Note, Due
Process of Law and Notice by Publication, 32 IND. L.J. 469 (1957).
28. It can be argued that the Supreme Court has already held Mullane applicable to
tax sales. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146 (1956) (notice of a tax sale by pub-
lication, posting, and mail to a known incompetent unconstitutional; Mullane quoted for
the applicable standard). See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 n.4 (1956);
cf. Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103 (1956). In Nelson, the Court upheld a tax
sale, dwelling at length on the adequacy of the notice provided. Id. at 105, 107-09, 110.
However, the tendency has been to read Covey narrowly, as having significance only for
the case of a known incompetent. See, e.g., Note, Marketable Title in New York State: Tax
Deeds, 9 SYRACUSE L. REv. 69, 75, 82 (1957); 23 BROOKLYN L. REv. 145 (1956); 6 BUFFALO
L. Rxv. 345 (1957).
29. Christie-Stewart, Inc. v. Paschall, 502 P.2d 1265 (Okla. 1972), vacated and re-
manded, 414 U.S. 100 (1973).
30. Umatilla County v. Porter, 12 Ore. App. 393, 507 P.2d 406 (1973).
31. Dow v. State, 46 Mich. App. 101, 207 N.W.2d 441, leave to appeal granted, 389
Mich. 817 (1973).
32. Botens v. Aronauer, 32 N.Y.2d 243, 298 N.E.2d 73, 344 N.Y.S.2d 892, appeal dis-
missed, 414 U.S. 1059 (1973).
33. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs v. Fugate, 210 Kan. 185, 499 P.2d 1101 (1972)
(per curiam); Chapin v. Aylward, 204 Kan. 448, 464 P.2d 177 (1970); Pierce v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 200 Kan. 74, 434 P.2d 858 (1967).
34. Laz v. Southwestern Land Co., 97 Ariz. 69, 397 P.2d 52 (1964); Johnson v. Mock, 19
Ariz. App. 283, 506 P.2d 1068 (1973).
35. Scoggin v. Schrunk, 344 F. Supp. 463 (D. Ore. 1971). Although the opinion does
not cite Mullane, it is based on the same principles.
36. The federal court in Oregon went even further. Concluding that "[t]here is a
correlation between the notice a taxpayer is entitled to receive and the extent of the loss
he might suffer by lack of adequate notice," the court held that notice by mail on two
separate occasions prior to the tax sale, in addition to published notice, was unconstitu-
tional where the owner stood to lose property worth in excess of $10,000 to satisfy a tax
lien of $209. 344 F. Supp. at 470.
37. 414 U.S. 100 (1973).
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the notice issue,38 and instead vacated the judgment below and re-
manded the case for a decision on the state issue.39
In the New York case, Botens v. Aronauer,40 the appeal was dis-
missed for want of a substantial federal question. This might be in-
terpreted as an approval of notice by publication, for the New York
Court of Appeals' opinion had explicitly upheld such notice. But an
examination of the record in Botens shows that the case did not really
involve notice by publication alone. Although the applicable statutes
required only published notice, it was the standard practice of the
county treasurer to mail notice before the tax sale to all owners
whose land was to be sold. 41 A second notice was mailed during the
redemption period.42 The appellants denied receiving the notice of
the sale, but did not deny receiving the redemption notice.43 These
facts were brought out in the appeal papers filed with the Supreme
Court by the appellees. 44 Thus, it would appear that the dismissal of
the appeal45 meant only that the Supreme Court did not think that
38. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Stewart, argued in dissent that the potential
state ground was insubstantial, and that the Court should reach the merits. 414 U.S. at
102-04. The Court's reluctance to reach the merits may have been due to the fact that
the appellants were the owners of a severed mineral interest, not the surface owner
whose name and address appeared on the tax rolls. See notes 65, 68 infra. Also, the Court
may have been concerned about upsetting thousands of titles based on tax deeds. See
pp. 1516-17 infra.
39. On remand, the Oklahoma supreme court held that there was an adequate state
ground to support its earlier decision. Christie-Stewart, Inc. v. Paschall, 45 J. OKLA. B.
ASS'N 2523 (Okla. Nov. 5, 1974).
40. 414 U.S. 1059, dismissing appeal from 32 N.Y.2d 243, 298 N.E.2d 73, 344 N.Y.S.2d
892 (1973).
41. Record on Appeal at 66, 70, Botens v. Aronauer, 32 N.Y.2d 243, 298 N.E.2d 73, 344
N.Y.S.2d 892 (1973). However, the treasurer was unable to produce a copy of the specific
notice sent to the appellants due to a five year records retention policy. Record on Appeal
at 68.
42. Record on Appeal at 68, 72, 73. The treasurer did produce a copy of the redemp-
tion notice sent to the appellants; a copy appears in the record. Id. at 75.
43. Record on Appeal at 26-28. The appellants only denied receiving notice of the
time when the redemption period would end. Id. at 27, 28. The redemption notice
specified the date of the tax sale but not the date on which the redemption period would
expire. Id. at 75. In its opinion, the New York Court of Appeals stated that "it is conceded
that [appellants] had not actually received the notice of redemption following the sale
. . . ." 32 N.Y.2d at 247, 298 N.E.2d at 74, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 894. This statement is simply
incorrect.
44. Appellee's Response to Jurisdictional Statement and Motion to Affirm at 1-2,
Motion to Dismiss or Affirm by the Attorney General of the State of New York at 3, 6
& n.*, Botens v. Aronauer, 414 U.S. 1059 (1973).
45. It has been said that dismissal of an appeal for want of a substantial federal
question is a decision on the merits with full precedential effect. See, e.g., Mercado v.
Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 666, 673 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1120 (1975). Other
eminent commentators have expressed a contrary view. See, e.g., STUDY GROUP ON THE
CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT 25-26 (1972); cf.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). In any event, the dismissal in Botens is no
authority for notice by publication, since mail notice- was given in that case. Paschall,
which expressly left the notice question open, was decided only two weeks before Botens.
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a case in which mail notice was actually given was a good case for
deciding the constitutionality of notice solely by publication. 4"
II. Justifications for Notice Solely by Publication
In Mullane the Supreme Court stated that the ultimate test of the
adequacy of notice is a balancing test: "Against th[e] interest of the
State we must balance the individual interest sought to be protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment." 47 In Mullane and every subsequent
case4 the Court has struck this balance against notice solely by pub-
lication when the name and address of the person whose rights were
being affected were readily available. In almost every tax sale case
the name and address of the property owner will be readily ascer-
tainable, either from the tax rolls, the county land records, or other-
wise. A direct application of the Mullane doctrine would lead to the
conclusion that notice by publication alone is unconstitutional and
that some form of personal notice by mail must be provided. There-
fore, if notice solely by publication is to be upheld, it is necessary to
determine whether there are any distinguishing features of the tax
sale which would justify a different balance in favor of notice by
publication alone.
A. The Delinquent Taxpayer Knows that his
Property will be Sold
The main argument which has been used to distinguish tax sales
from Mullane is that the owner who does not pay his taxes knows
that his property will be sold as a result. It is an argument which has
appeared in all four of the recent state court opinions upholding
notice by publication.
49
The only basis for the presumption that the delinquent taxpayer
knows what will happen is the general legal fiction that "everyone
knows the law." In reality, this is a rather dubious assumption. Since
landowners will have had prior experience with the annual assessment
of taxes on their property, it is safe to assume that they will know
46. The issue is likely to reach the Supreme Court again soon. It is now pending be-
fore a three-judge federal district court. Wager v. Lind, 389 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(order for the convening of a three-judge court).
47. 339 U.S. at 314.
48. See cases cited in notes 24-26 supra.
49. Christie-Stewart, Inc. v. Paschall, 502 P.2d 1265, 1266-67 (Okla. 1972); Umatilla
County v. Porter, 12 Ore. App. 393, 395, 396,'397, 507 P.2d 406, 407, 408 (1973); Dow v.
State, 46 Mich. App. 101, 107, 108, 207 NAV.2d 441, 444 (1973); Botens v. Aronauer, 32
N.Y.2d 243, 249, 298 N.E.2d 73, 75, 344 N.Y.S.2d 892, 895 (1973).
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that taxes are due each year on their land. But, since most owners pay
their taxes every year, they will not have had prior experience with
the tax sale system; it is doubtful that they will know the consequences
of missing a tax payment.
It might still be argued that ignorance of consequences is no ex-
cuse, that the law may assume knowledge of its provisions. But this
argument fails to distinguish Mullane for two reasons. First, Muilane
required personal notice despite knowledge by the individuals that
their property interests were being affected.50 The common trust fund
involved in Mullane existed under specific statutory authorization.5'
The statute required the trustee to make application for the judicial
settlement of his accounts 12 to 15 months after the fund was estab-
lished and triennially thereafter.52 The statute also required that the
beneficiaries be mailed a copy of those portions of the statute relating
to the judicial settlement of the accounts. 53 Thus, in Mullane, the
general legal fiction that everyone knows the law actually had some
basis in fact. The beneficiaries knew that periodic judicial settlements
would be taking place, and even had a fairly good idea of when the
proceedings would occur. Yet the possibility that the mailing of copies
of the statute might serve as adequate notice of the later proceedings
was dismissed out of hand by the Supreme Court.54 If the actual mail-
ing of a copy of the statute is not adequate notice of later proceedings
under it, surely the fiction that everyone knows the law fares no better.
Second, the argument that an owner who does not pay his taxes
knows that his land will be sold assumes what should be its conclu-
sion-that the taxes actually were not paid. Any tax sale procedure
necessarily involves a determination that the taxes were in fact not
paid.55 At least in the first instance, this is an administrative determi-
nation made by local officials, who can and do make mistakes. 0 A
50. But see Botens v. Aronauer, 32 N.Y.2d 243, 249, 298 N.E.2d 73, 75, 344 N.Y.S.2d 892,
896 (1973). Botens is simply inaccurate on this point.
51. 339 U.S. at 308.
52. Id. at 309.
53. Id. at 310.
54. Id. at 318.
55. See Legg, Tax Sales and the Constitution, 20 OKLA. L. REV. 365, 374-75 (1967). In
some states, this determination is made judicially (see, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 312.090-.100
(1973)); in other states, administratively (see, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAw §§ 1000-1006
(McKinney Supp. 1974)). This difference is irrelevant for purposes of determining the
adequacy of the notice provided. The Supreme Court has applied the Mullane standards
to both cases involving judicial proceedings (Mullane itself) and administrative proceed-
ings (Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956)).
56. For an almost comic example of this, see Ponder v. Ebey, 194 Okla. 407, 152 P.2d
268 (1944). In that case, the owner made no less than six separate attempts to pay his
taxes and have that fact recorded by the county treasurer. Nonetheless, his land was sold
by the county treasurer for the nonpayment of taxes. Fortunately, he did succeed in
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determination that taxes have not been paid cannot be assumed to
be correct until the owner is notified of the determination and given
an opportunity to challenge it.5 An owner who has in fact paid his
taxes will have absolutely no reason to expect his land to be sold,
even if he is completely familiar with the applicable tax sale statute.58
Thus, the argument that a delinquent taxpayer knows the law or is
ignorant at his peril does not successfully distinguish tax sales from
Mullane.0
B. The Government's Need to Collect Revenue
A second major argument used to distinguish tax sale proceedings
from Mullane is that the state has an important need6 to collect the
taxes due it.61 When real estate tax delinquency reached crisis propor-
tions during the Depression, several states enacted laws authorizing
in rem tax foreclosure proceedings to supplement the existing in per-
sonam foreclosure remedies. 2 These laws were designed to reduce
getting his property back, but only after several years of litigation. For a case in which
an owner who had paid his taxes did not succeed in getting his property back, see Rogers
v. Dent, 292 Mo. 576, 239 S.W. 1074 (1922).
57. For the same reason, the argument that notice by publication is justified because
the delinquent taxpayer is a wrongdoer (see W. VA. CODE ANN. § IlA-3-1 (1974)) must be
rejected. Also, the notion that a wrongdoer is entitled to less notice than others could
not have survived Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972). The appellant in that case
was a convicted robber, and the proceeding was for the forfeiture of his car, which had
been used in the robbery. The Supreme Court held the notice unconstitutional, applying
Mullane.
58. Many states provide a longer statute of limitations for challenging a tax deed if
the challenge is based on a claim that the taxes had been paid. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL
PROP. TAX LAW § 1020(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974). But a longer statute of limitations
will not do an owner much good if he has no knowledge of the tax sale and if, as would
be good strategy, the tax sale purchaser "lies low" awaiting his windfall. For the same
reason, the existence of the redemption period will not justify inadequate notice of the
tax sale.
59. Another argument made is that notice of (and an opportunity to be heard on) the
initial imposition of the taxes is sufficient notice of the tax sale proceedings. Botens v.
Aronauer, 32 N.Y.2d 243, 248-49, 298 N.E.2d 73, 75, 344 N.Y.S.2d 892, 895 (1973). The
only way to make any sense of this argument is by adding the proposition that an owner
who does not pay his taxes knows what will happen. Thus, this argument is simply a
particular form of the argument just considered.
60. While the traditional deference to the taxation power, see note 13 supra, remains
with respect to substantive policy (see, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1974)),
it has disappeared with respect to questions of notice. S~e Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v.
City of Milwaukee, 352 U.S. 948 (1956) (per curiam), on remand, 275 Wis. 121, 81, N.W.2d
298 (1957) (Mullane applied to a special tax assessment proceeding); Nelson v. City of
New York, 352 U.S. 103 (1956); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
61. See Dow v. State, 46 Mich. App. 101, 108-09, 207 N.W.2d 441, 444 (1973); Spitcauf-
sky v. Hatten, 353 Mo. 94, 111, 182 S.W.2d 86, 96 (1944); Umatilla County v. Porter, 12
Ore. App. 393, 396, 507 P.2d 406, 408 (1973).
It is sometimes said that the state has a need to collect taxes speedily. See Dow v.
State, supra. This is dubious, as the asset (the real property) securing the tax lien will
not suddenly disappear, and the state can borrow if it needs immediate cash. Also, the
provision of adequate notice need not delay the timing of the tax sale proceedings at all.
62. The National Municipal League published a model in rem foreclosure law in
1935. Comm. on a Model Tax Collection Law, National Municipal League, A Model Real
Property Tax Collection Law, 24 NAT'L MUN. REV. 289 (1935) [hereinafter cited as 1935
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the prohibitive cost 63 of the in personam procedures0 4 The in rem
method reduced costs by, inter alia, eliminating the requirement of
personal service on all interested parties and the need for a title search
to determine who those parties were.65
While these laws may have been addressed to a real problem,06 it is
important to distinguish between mail notice of a proceeding and
personal service of process. The mail notice required by Mullane is
far less costly than regular personal service. 7 A requirement of mail
MODEL LAW]. A revised edition was issued in 1954. CoMfm. ON A PROGRAM OF MODEL
FISCAL LEGISLATION, NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL REAL PROPERTY TAX COLLECTION
LAW (2d ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as 1954 MODEL LAW]. Both model laws require only
notice by publication. 1935 MODEL LAW §§ 24, 46; 1954 MODEL LAW art. VI, § 5, art. IX,
3. On the history of the model law and state adoptions of statutes based on it, see 1954
MODEL LAW V, Xii-XVI.
Statutes requiring only notice by publication were upheld by several state supreme
courts. See Gathwright v. Mayor & City Council, 181 Md. 362, 30 A.2d 252 (1943); Spitcauf-
sky v. Hatten, 353 Mo. 94, 182 S.W.2d 86 (1944); City of Newark v. Yeskel, 5 N.J. 313, 74
A.2d 883 (1950). Two cases from New York were taken to the Supreme Court. City of
New Rochelle v. Echo Bay Waterfront Corp., 294 N.Y. 678, 60 N.E.2d 838, cert. denied,
326 U.S. 720 (1945); Delavan Home & Land Co. v. County of Erie, 294 N.Y. 847, 62
N.E.2d 396, appeal dismissed, 326 U.S. 681 (1945) (dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question, citing Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U.S. 526 (1895)
(see note 5 supra)). These two Supreme Court actions were interpreted by some as con-
stituting a general approval of in rem tax foreclosure statutes. In Rem Foreclosure of
Tax Liens, in MUNICIPALITIES AND THE LAW IN ACTION 1946, at 511, 516, 519-20 (C. Rhyne
ed. 1946). However, these actions offer no support for notice by publication because (1)
neither involved a full decision on the merits, (2) both came before the decision in
Mullane, and (3) the New York statutes involved required mail notice to the owner. N.Y.
Tax Law § 165-b, ch. 692, § 2, [1939] Laws of N.Y. 1642, 1653 (now N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx
LAW § 1124 (McKinney Supp. 1974)); Erie County Tax Act § 11-13.0, ch. 789, § 18, [1944]
Laws of N.Y. 1743, 1749-50.
Although the Depression crisis has passed, one recent Note has argued that the situa-
tion in certain urban areas of New Jersey is such that the New Jersey in rem foreclosure
statute (which requires only notice by publication) should be extended to cases to which
it does not now apply. Note, Tax Sale Law in New Jersey: A Re-Examination, 26
RUTGERS L. REv. 266 (1973). In 1971, the Missouri legislature enacted an in rem fore-
closure statute applicable to St. Louis which requires only notice by publication. Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 92.700-.920 (Supp. 1975). See Langsdorf, Urban Decay, Property Tax
Delinquency: A Solution in St. Louis, 5 URB. LAW. 729 (1973).
63. See A. HILLHOUSE & C. CHATTERS, TAX-REVERTED PROPERTIES IN URBAN AREAS 11, 13,
18-20 (1942); Xanthaky, Improvements in Foreclosure Procedure, in PROPERTY TAXES 262,
262-63 (Tax Policy League ed. 1940).
64. See 1954 MODEL LAW, supra note 62, at xviii-xix. In one city in New York, the
average foreclosure cost per parcel was S4.60 under the in rem procedure, as compared
to $101 under the in personam procedure. Xanthaky, supra note 63, at 273-74.
65. 1954 MODEL L-V, supra note 62, at xix. However, Xanthaky's data show that the
title search and personal service accounted for only $21 of the $101 cost of the in personam
procedure. Xanthaky, supra note 63, at 274. Thus, substantial savings could have been
effected without cutting back at all on the notice given. As a matter of due process, notice
is the last thing which should be cut back. A person who knows his property interests are
about to be cut off but does nothing to prevent it has much less to complain about than
a person whose interests are cut off without his knowledge because the only "notice" given
him was by publication.
66. There is some doubt whether the in personam procedures were really unworkable.
For a description of a successful property tax collection effort during the Depression using
an in personam procedure, see Kemp, A Survey of Procedures for the Collection of
Delinquent Taxes, in MUNICIPALITIES AND THE LAW IN ACTION IN 1941, at 353, 358-61 (C.
Rhyne ed. 1942). See generally A. HILLHOUSE & C. CHATrERS, supra note 63, at 31-41.
67. The $4.60 cost for the in rem procedure, see note 64 supra, included the cost of
mail notice to the owner, which the New York in rem statute required. Xanthaky, supra
note 63, at 269. Xanthaky estimated the cost of this notice to be "about a dime." Id.
1514
Notice by Publication in Tax Sale Proceedings
notice would not add appreciably to the cost of an in rem tax fore-
closure proceeding.08 Even if the costs were significant, they could
be added to the amount of the back taxes, to be recovered when the
owner paid up or when the property was sold. Certainly the indi-
vidual's strong interest in mail notice as compared to published notice
outweighs any small additional expense to the government. 69
C. The Caretaker Theory
The recent tax sale cases approving notice by publication have re-
lied in part upon the caretaker theory: the owner of property is under
68. While the cost of sending notice by mail would not be substantial, the cost of a
title search to determine the interested parties might be substantial, depending on how
the land records are organized. Mullane approved of notice by publication as to those
trust fund beneficiaries whose interests "could be discovered" but "do not in due course
of business come to knowledge of the common trustee." 339 U.S. at 317. However, this
holding was based in part on a representation theory (id. at 319) which would not apply
to the usual tax sale case. In any event, Mullane makes it clear that the fact that the
identities of certain interested parties (such as lienholders or owners of severed mineral
interests) may be too difficult to determine is no excuse for failing to provide mail notice
to those parties whose interests and whereabouts are known (id. at 318), in particular, the
owner of the property whose name and address appear on the tax rolls.
69. The balance to be struck between the owner's interest and the government's
interest can be illuminated by comparing the tax sale situation to Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970). In that case, welfare recipients claimed that due process requires a full
evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of welfare benefits, in addition to the
personal notice, informal hearing, opportunity for review by a higher official, and post-
termination full hearing which were already provided. Explicitly applying a balancing
test, the Court held that the recipient's interest in the pretermination full hearing, com-
bined with the government's interest in preventing the erroneous termination of pay-
ments, outweighed the government's interest in preventing payments to ineligible
recipients.
Each of the factors weighed in Goldberg has a direct counterpart in the tax sale situa-
tion. The government's interest in preventing illegal welfare payments and the interest
in collecting tax revenue are simply two sides of the same coin-protection of the public
fisc. (There are indications that the Court gives greater deference to the taxation power
than to the spending power. Compare Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) with 'Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975). But compare Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,
452-53 (1973) with Austin v. New Hampshire, 95 S. Ct. 1191 (1975). Cf. Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58 (1968). See note 60 supra.) But the government interest in
collecting property taxes is much weaker because the tax lien is secured by an im-
movable asset (the real property), whereas illegal payments to ineligible welfare recipients
are unlikely ever to be recovered.
On the other side of the scales, the government surely has an interest in preventing the
erroneous tax sale of an owner's property. And the difference to the individual between
mail notice (which is almost certain to reach him) and published notice (which is usually
no notice at all) is much greater than the difference in Goldberg between a full hearing
and the informal hearing already provided.
The Court struck the balance in Goldberg in favor of the due process claim. It follows
that the same balance must be struck in the tax sale situation.
At a higher level of generalization, it can be said that the welfare recipient's interest
is in the continued receipt of payments, while the property owner's interest is in the re-
tention of his property. Which of these interests is stronger depends ultimately on one's
views about private property and the welfare state. In a society where private property
and the work ethic are still held in high regard, it can certainly be argued that the
property owner's interest is stronger. Also, it can be strongly argued that, in a con-
stitutional sense, the owner's interest is stronger because welfare recipients would have
no constitutional claim if a state were to completely abolish its welfare program whereas
property owners would have a constitutional claim if a state were to expropriate all
private property. Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
29-37 (1973).
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a duty to watch the published notices.to see if there is anything af-
fecting his property. 0 But the caretaker theory, in this broad form,
was firmly rejected in Mullane. The Court said it was "too much" to
expect an individual to "examine all that is published to see if some-
thing may be tucked away in it that affects his property interests."7 '
One paragraph in the Mullane opinion did seem to approve a much
more limited form of the caretaker theory.7 2 The Court suggested
that, with respect to tangible property, notice by publication might
be acceptable if it was used as a supplement to other action, such as
seizure or entry upon real estate, which in itself might be expected
to come to the owner's attention. However, this paragraph of Mullane
bears little relevance to the tax sale problem, for, of the 21 jurisdic-
tions which permit notice solely by publication, only one7 3 requires
any kind of seizure or entry upon the land to which the published
notice would be supplemental.74 In any event, it is now doubtful
whether this paragraph of Mullane retains any continued vitality.7
D. Titles Based on Tax Deeds Should Not be Upset
The rule that notice by publication is sufficient in tax sale pro-
ceedings should be upheld, it is argued, in order to avoid upsetting
"the validity of thousands of titles" based on tax deeds.70 This argu-
ment is not a justification, as such, for notice by publication, but
70. Dow v. State, 46 Mich. App. 101, 106, 108, 207 N.V.2d 441, 443, 444 (1973); Botens
v. Aronauer, 32 N.Y.2d 243, 249, 298 N.E.2d 73, 75, 344 N.Y.S.2d 892, 895 (1973).
71. 339 U.S. at 320. Another argument clearly rejected in Mullane, id. at 312-13, that
notice by publication is sufficient because a tax sale is a proceeding in rem, has never-
theless been used in some of the recent tax sale cases. Botens v. Aronauer, 32 N.Y.2d 243,
248, 298 N.E.2d 73, 74, 344 N.Y.S.2d 892, 895 (1973); Umatilla County v. Porter, 12 Ore.
App. 393, 396, 507 P.2d 406, 408 (1973).
72. 339 U.S. at 316.
73. The South Carolina tax sale statute requires the sheriff to "[sleize and take ex-
clusive possession of" the real estate before the tax sale, as well as publish notice of the
sale. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-2766 (Supp. 1974).
74. Nonetheless, two recent tax sale cases have relied on this paragraph of Mullane. In
Dow v. State, 46 Mich. App. 101, 107-08, 207 N.W.2d 441, 444 (1973), the court simply
misread this paragraph as approving of the broad caretaker theory. In Christie-Stewart,
Inc. v. Paschall, 502 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Okla. 1972), the court said that the "other action" to
which notice by publication was supplemental was the existence of the tax sale statute.
This is hardly the kind of "direct attack" upon property to which the Mullane paragraph
referred. This logic would have justified notice by publication in Mullane itself.
75. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, rev'g per curiamn People ex rel. Hanrahan
v. One 1965 Oldsmobile, 52 Il1. 2d 37, 42, 284 N.E.2d 646, 651 (1972); Schroeder v. City of
New York, 371 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1962). In both of these cases, there was a seizure to which
the other notice given could be said to be supplemental. But in Schroeder, the Court
rejected the notion that the seizure might itself be considered a form of notice; in
Robinson, the Court did not even discuss the possibility. In both cases, the other notice
given was held unconstitutional under the Mullane standard.
76. Botens v. Aronauer, 32 N.Y.2d 243, 247, 298 N.E.2d 73, 74, 344 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894
(1973).
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states that, the rule having been established in the turn of the century
cases, it would be too disruptive of settled expectations to change it
now. However, a holding that notice by publication is unconstitu-
tional would not have to be applied retroactively. In similar situa-
tions, the Supreme Court has applied a new constitutional rule only
prospectively.7 7 For example, in cases holding that property restric-
tions on the franchise in bond issue elections were unconstitutional,
the Court gave the rulings only prospective effect in order to avoid
interfering with bonds already issued following such elections.
78
Of course this is not to say that retroactive effect should be denied
to a holding that notice by publication in tax sale proceedings is un-
constitutional. Retroactive application of the new rule would not
necessarily defeat all titles based on tax deeds. First, not every deed
would be challenged; the owner may in fact have abandoned the
property. Second, the doctrine of adverse possession would defeat chal-
lenges to most older deeds.70 More importantly, the purpose of giving
retroactive effect to the holding of unconstitutionality would be to
vindicate the principle" that no person should be deprived of his
property without adequate notice.81 In those cases where a challenge
was brought, the result would be that the tax sale purchaser would
lose his windfall, and the owner would be restored to the excess value
of his property. This would not be an unjust result.
77. See generally Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Stand-
ards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 254-61 (1973); Mishkin, The High
Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56
(1965); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor
Mishkin, 33 U. CH. L. REv. 719 (1966); Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive
Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
78. Hill v. Stone, 95 S. Ct. 1637, 1645 (1975); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.
204, 213-15 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969).
In all of these cases, the retroactivity issue was decided in the same case in which
the new constitutional rule was announced. But in other situations, the retroactivity
question has been left to a later decision. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)
(Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), given only prospective effect); G. GUNTHER & N.
DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 892-97 (8th ed. 1970).
79. In the majority of states where color of title is not required, the tax deed would
be irrelevant once the adverse possession period had run. In the few states which require
color of title, a void tax deed would satisfy this requirement. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 15A(c) (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
Special short statutes of limitations for bringing challenges to tax deeds might shield
all but very recent deeds from attack. Whether the lack of constitutionally valid notice
would preclude the running of a statute of limitations is a question on which the
Supreme Court explicitly declined to express any view in Paschall v. Christie-Stewart,
Inc., 414 U.S. 100, 102 n.4 (1973). Compare Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706
(1969) and City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 214 (1970) (challenge must be
brought within statutory period) with Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 210,
214 (1962) (challenge after statutory period allowed).
80. See Wellington, supra note 77, at 256.
81. Adequate notice was described in Mullane as "[a]n elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process...." 339 U.S. at 314.
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Conclusion
As the Supreme Court said in Mullane:
Where the names and post-office addresses of those affected by a
proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means
less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency. -8 2
The arguments for notice by publication in tax sale cases have been
considered above. None justifies exempting tax sales from the Mullane
rule.83 Therefore, in an appropriate case, the Supreme Court should
declare that notice solely by publication in tax sale proceedings is
unconstitutional. In the meantime, the legislatures in the 21 jurisdic-
tions which now allow such notice should not wait, but should act
promptly to provide at least the minimal notice required by the
Constitution.
As the above-quoted passage from Mullane indicates, the minimal
constitutional requirements4 appears to be notice mailed to the own-
er's last known address.s 5 However, one court has held that the owner's
interest in not losing his property for taxes amounting to a fraction
of its value is jo strong that even greater efforts by the state are re-
quired.8 6 In any event, the states should go beyond the minimal con-
stitutional requirements in order to be as certain as possible that no
forefeiture of property takes place before the owner is made aware of
the threat and given an opportunity to prevent his loss.
82. Id. at 318.
83. It might be argued that while none of the justifications offered by itself out-
weighs the individual's interest in personal notice, all of them taken together do out-
weigh that interest. But any such overall balancing clearly favors the individual owner.
Personal notice by mail is almost certain to reach the owner; published notice is almost
certain not to. And without notice, the owner may suffer the complete loss of his
property for back taxes equalling a fraction of its value. On the other hand, mail notice
would be only a small additional expense for the state. That mail notice would not be
a major burden is indicated by the fact that 30 states already require such notice in all
tax sale proceedings, and 19 of the other 21 jurisdictions provide mail notice in at least
some cases. See note 4 supra.
84. See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 214 (1962) (notice is "an obliga-
tion which the mailing of a single letter would have discharged."); Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956) ("Even a letter would have apprised him that his
property was about to be taken .... ").
85. Questions concerning when mail notice is required (before the tax sale, before the
end of the redemption period, etc.) are not considered here. If the reference in Schroeder
to "a single letter" (note 84 supra) is taken literally, the absolute minimum requirement
would appear to be notice mailed to the owner at some point before the tax sale
procedures are completed.
86. Scoggin v. Schrunk, 344 F. Supp. 463, 470 (D. Ore. 1971). See note 36 supra.
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